Smith appears to make some questionable assumptions in offering the theory of the invisible hand.  The following passage encapsulates the problem:

Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his own advantage, indeed, and not that of the society, which he has in view. But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily, leads him to prefer that employment which is most advantageous to the society. (IV.2.4)

It is unclear that every individual actually strives for the most efficacious “employment” of his capital, even granting that the measure of efficacy is not necessarily objective, and could be based on an individual’s subjective assessment.  A relevant and unavoidable issue in this regard is the asymmetry of information that results in the potential discrepancy between subjective evaluation and the objective reality.  As Hahn puts it, “agents on one side of the market have information which is superior to that possessed by agents on the other” (7).  But this level of analysis is already assumes one step more than it is necessary; in fact, there seems to be nothing that would prevent one from engaging in a transaction that is “detrimental” insofar as it fails to maximize profit—a simple act of charity, for example.  Of course, one could convincingly argue that charity might merely be a prelude or a tactic to secure greater future gains, but this is certainly not the only modality through which charity can manifest itself.

Assuming, however, that individuals are nonetheless predominately motivated by the particular configuration of self-interest that Smith has in mind, it is unclear whether the “society” to which advantage accrues is necessarily the immediate and “entire” society to which the individual belongs.  It seems quite plausible that the benefits thus obtained might be concentrated in very few hands within a society.  Do these beneficiaries represent the interests of society in general?  Smith clearly privileges the total sum of “benefits,” but in this case there seems to be some ambiguity in the meaning of “benefit,” especially when some elements within society may actually experience substantial “losses” in the process.

Lastly, what is the main thrust behind invoking the putatively collective interests of society?  Is it to justify action based primarily on self-interest?  It is a strange moment when Smith writes, “I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good” (IV.2.9).  If Smith is right that society receives the greatest benefit even when every individual works to advance his own advantage, and if such a theory informs this egocentric modality, it seems that maximizing the public good is precisely the goal—why must it be hidden?