Is interesting to consider whether the “dominant protective association” is a state(Nozick 22-25).  Nozick suggests that is does constitute a state when he says it only “appears that the dominant protective agency in a territory not only lacks the requisite monopoly over the use of force, but also fails to provide protection for all in its territory” (25).  One might raise some questions at this point.  Does the definition of the state also imply or specify that it must be a moral or legitimate entity?   In practice, it is clear that states can and do engage in activities both immoral and illegitimate.  Such a question is partly in response to Nozick’s emphasis that “[we] have discharged our task of explaining how a state would arise from a state of nature without anyone’s rights being violated.  The moral objections of the individualist anarchist to the minimal state are overcome” (114).  Additionally, the question is a prelude to what is perhaps a more important question: can the state be positively identified as a centralized or limited entity?

In practice, many functions which might otherwise belong to the state are in fact outsourced to private parties.  As such, how is the scope of the state to be defined? Indeed, the idea that a dominant protective agency can provide certain functions which qualify as state functions suggests that a state might actually be coterminous with its effects.  Given that Nozick positions or attempts to legitimize the state in opposition to a condition of anarchy, it seems that he must limit the scope of the state to certain positive embodiment of its functions.  Yet, this seems to discount the role of the state in enabling and sanctioning various functions within it’s boundaries.  If these functions are an extension of what might otherwise have been direct state function, it would seem that this entire network should be interpreted as one large and complex state apparatus.